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Abstract
The Great Filter interpretation of Fermi’s great silence asserts that Npq
is not a very large number, where N is the number of potentially life-
supporting planets in the observable universe, p is the probability that a
randomly chosen such planet develops intelligent life to the level of present-
day human civilization, and q is the conditional probability that it then
goes on to develop a technological supercivilization visible all over the ob-
servable universe. Evidence suggests that N is huge, which implies that
pq is very small. Hanson (1998) and Bostrom (2008) have argued that
the discovery of extraterrestrial life would point towards p not being small
and therefore a very small q, which can be seen as bad news for human-
ity’s prospects of colonizing the universe. Here we investigate whether a
Bayesian analysis supports their argument, and the answer turns out to
depend critically on the choice of prior distribution.
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1 Introduction
Recent discoveries such as Earth-like planets in the habitable zone around another star
(Quintana et al. 2014, Cassan et al. 2012) could plausibly increase expectations to
find life elsewhere and possibly under similar conditions as on planet Earth. However,
in contrast to popular opinion, Hanson (1998) and Bostrom (2008) have suggested
that a future discovery of extraterrestrial life would be bad news for humanity. The
reasoning behind this view rests on Hanson’s so-called Great Filter formalism (Aldous
2012, Hanson 1998). The number N of potentially life-supporting planets is huge
(perhaps around 1022) (Cassan et al. 2012). Take p to be the probability that a
randomly chosen such planet develops life and a technological civilization on the level
of humanity today, and q to be the probability that a randomly chosen planet having
reached that level goes on to form a super-technological civilization, defined as one
that is noticeable to astronomers everywhere in the observable universe. Then the
expected number of such super-technological civilizations is Npq. The great silence
of the Fermi Paradox (Webb 2002, C´irkovic´ 2009) indicates that the actual number of
such super-technological civilizations is 0, suggesting that the order of magnitude of
Npq is at most 1. The fact that there is an astronomical number of exoplanets would
imply that pq is very small, but discovery of extraterrestrial life would be evidence
that p is not very small, in which case q must be very small, which in turn suggests
that humanity’s prospects of eventually reaching the maturity of a super-technological
civilizations are bleak. In the present paper we investigate whether or not a rigorous
statistical analysis supports this.
The issue of what the discovery of extraterrestrial life would mean to humanity
has a certain timeless flavor to it. Yet, it is perhaps more pressing now than ever,
for two reasons. First, it has become increasingly clear that humanity in the coming
century or so faces a number of non-negligible risks threatening our very existence
(Bostrom & Cirkovic 2008, Pamlin & Armstrong 2015, Bostrom 2014, Martin 2006,
Rees 2003); a very small value of q might be an indication that the situation requires
even more care than we have hitherto realized. Second, the discovery of exoplanets,
3
many of which seem to be potentially life-supporting, is proceeding at a rapid pace
(Petigura et al. 2013), and perhaps we will soon attain the ability to detect definite
signs of life out there (Brandt & Spiegel 2014).
We write
Npq 6≫ 1 , (1)
for the claim that Npq has order of magnitude at most 1. This relation is called
the Great Filter, as it says that all or almost all planets are filtered out somewhere
on the path from its genesis to the emergence of a super-technological civilization.
The Great Filter has a predecessor in the Drake equation for the number of civiliza-
tions active in radio astronomy in the Milky Way, which was formulated by Frank
Drake in 1961, and which since then has enjoyed an iconic status in the search for
extraterrestrial intelligence (Webb 2002). The Great Filter differs from the Drake
equation, not only in a choice of factorization that zooms in on the future prospects
for present-day humanity, but also in a number of other aspects, including lifting the
focus from the Milky Way to the entire visible universe, a move that is motivated by
the apparent in-principle feasibility of both intergalactic colonization (over long time
scales) and the construction of engineering structures visible over intergalactic dis-
tances (Armstrong & Sandberg 2013, Griffith et al. 2015, Ha¨ggstro¨m 2016). While it
is conceivable that there could be very advanced civilizations that are for some reason
invisible to us, basic evolutionary arguments and the astronomical time scale of the
universe suggest that if advanced technological civilizations were common, some of
them would have been observable here long ago (Hart 1975, Hanson 1998, Ha¨ggstro¨m
2016). Again, this suggest that pq has to be really small.
It seems to us worthwile to investigate whether the arguments of Hanson (1998)
and Bostrom (2008) on the discovery of extraterrestrial life as bad news to human-
ity survive a more rigorous statistical analysis. In the choice between a frequentist
statistical formalism and a Bayesian one, we opt for the latter. A general reason in
favor of a Bayesian framwork is that it is the only one that can produce probabilistic
statements about the whereabouts of the parameter values of interest. A more spe-
4
cific reason is that the philosophy behind frequentist statistics, with its emphasis on
independent repetitions of experiments (Cox & Hinkley 1979, Salsburg 2001), seems
ill-suited to the present context, as we observe Fermi’s great silence once and for all,
so that the idea of independently repeating the experiment borders on the nonsensi-
cal. A downside of the Bayesian approach is that (as we shall see) the results may
depend on the choice of prior distribution, especially so when data are sparse.
2 Analysis
To accomodate the possibility of observing primitive life on another planet, we choose
to factorize p in the Great Filter equation (1) one step further as p = rs, where r is
the probability that a randomly chosen planet with potential for supporting life does
develop life to the level of (say) amoebas, and s is the probability that such a planet
goes on to the level of persent-day human technological civilization, conditional on
having reached the amoeba level. Thus, (1) turns into
Nrsq 6≫ 1 . (2)
Note that relations (1) and (2) are neither very precise statements, nor known truths,
but should be thought of as plausible conjectures given Fermi’s great silence.
For the Bayesian analysis, we think of N as fixed and very large, and need to
devise a prior on [0, 1]3 for the three unknown parameters r, s and q. Estimating
how likely emergence of life is on a typical planet, as quantified by r and s, is yet
a basic unresolved question possibly spanning physics, chemistry and biology (these
could also inform us about crucial barriers in q). Given that a Great Filter could also
relate to some difficulty of developing social complexity, social sciences may have a
relevant role to play as well. Biogenesis suggests that r > 0, but it could be very
small (and similarly for s). Without more precise knowledge, it makes sense to have
a prior that is spread out all over [0,1] for each parameter. A natural first idea is to
take the prior to be uniform on [0, 1]3, corresponding to each of the three parameters
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being, independently of the others, uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Our (partly hypothetical) data is as follows. First we have the great silence,
which we represent as N independent Bernoulli trials with success probability rsq, all
taking value 0 (failure to produce noticeable super-technological civilisations). Then
we consider the effect of two different (hypothetical) possible observations. First, to
observe amoeba-level primitive life on a single planet, represented as a Bernoulli trial
with success probability r taking value 1 (success). Second, to observe a technological
civilization on the level of humanity today, a Bernoulli trial with success probability
rs. In particular, we are interested in what effect this has on the statistical uncertainty
about q.
At this point, we expect that attentive readers will suggest that we have one more
piece of data to take into account, namely the observation that on planet Earth, we
have evolved – a probability p (= rs) event. Following Bostrom (2008), we believe
that including that piece of data in the Bayesian conditioning would be a mistake,
because no matter what the true value of p is, all observers would note that they
themselves have evolved, so our observation that we have evolved seems to offer no
evidence one way or the other about p. But the jury is still out on this somewhat
subtle issue, which seems to hinge on the choice between the so-called self-sampling
and self-indication assumptions in the study of observer selection effects (Armstrong
2011, Ha¨ggstro¨m 2016, Bostrom 2002).
If we accept the parameter q as a guide to humanity’s prospects of making it
all the way to becoming a super-technological civilization, then the most relevant
quantity to look at is the expected value of q under the posterior distribution. In
particular, we are interested in how that expected value changes when we switch from
the posterior we get after just seeing the great silence to the one that also incorporates
the observation of primitive or human-level life on one planet.
Figure 1 shows the effect of one observation of primitive life, where we have taken
the number of planets (experiments described by parameters r, s, q) to vary. First,
we see that only observing Fermi’s silence gradually lowers the expected value of q
with an increasing number of planets. This can be understood from that the Bayesian
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Figure 1: The effect of extraterrestrial life on q with a uniform prior for r, s, q on
[0, 1]3.
posterior becomes proportional to (1− rsq)N , and with N failed experiments getting
bigger, it makes the posterior reflect that one or more of r, s and q have to be small.
Second, we see the large effect that an additional observation of primitive life has
on the posterior, shifting the posterior belief on q much closer to zero. This can be
understood as the new observation shifting probability in the posterior towards larger
values of r, and taken together with the observations from Fermi’s silence restricting
rsq to be small, this has to lower the other parameters which decreases the expected
value. The same line of reasoning holds for observing human-level life, with belief
shifted proportional to rs, making the effect on q much more drastic. The results are
in line with what we could expect from the preceding discussion, and shows one way
to quantify the Great Filter argument. Analogous calculations can be made for the
cases of the discoveries of extinct primitive life (a probability r(1 − s) event) and an
extinct human-level civilization (a probability rs(1 − q) event).
But this is all for one particular choice of prior: uniform distribution on [0, 1]3. As
one of us has argued earlier (Ha¨ggstro¨m 2007), uniform distribution is not in general a
hallmark of objectivity, but just a model assumption among many other possibilities,
whence unreflected and perfunctory use of it is bad practice. In this case, it may be
argued that uniform distribution attaches unreasonably small probabilities to very
small values of the parameters. For instance, it is not a priori implausible to imagine
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a universe in which biogenesis is possible (as it clearly is, or else we would not exist)
but requires some very low probability event, such as the chance assembly of some
specific and rather long RNA molecule (allowing biological evolution which depends on
replication to take over and make rapid progress by becoming the dominating driver).
This could easily imply a value of r less than, say, 10−50, but uniform distribution
assigns a mere 10−50 probability to the event that r takes such a small value, which
is just too small to reflect our taking the possibility seriously. A distribution that
takes the possibility of very small parameter values more reasonably into account
is the log-uniform, which was suggested in a similar setting by Tegmark (Tegmark
2014). A log-uniform distribution on [0, 1] has probability density proportional to 1
x
.
Unfortunately, 1
x
blows up near x = 0 in such a way that
∫
1
0
1
x
dx = ∞, so we have
to truncate the distribution near 0. Somewhat arbitrarily, we take the cutoff to be
10−100, giving r density 1
Cx
on [10−100, 1], where C =
∫
0
10−100
1
x
dx = 100 ln(10) is a
normalizing constant to make it a probability measure. Independently, we let s and q
have the same distribution, so that the full prior is concentrated on [10−100, 1]3 with
density 1
C3xyz
.
As far as the influence of discovering extraterrestrial life on the expected value
of q, this prior gives qualitatively similar results as the uniform prior: in Figure 2,
we see that, similarly to Figure 1, observing primitive life always lowers the expected
value of q. Again, the effect on q by an observation of a human-level civilization is
more drastic. Starting out from different absolute levels of expected value reflects
that we start out from the prior with much larger weight on small values. However,
the remaining reasoning goes the same as the model of failures in the Great Filter
and success on one planet has a similar effect with the new prior.
In the two priors tried so far, the parameters r, s and q have been taken to be
independent. It is not clear that this is the most reasonable choice to make. One
way to reason is to suspect that all or most universes in some (real or hypothetical)
multiverse are either generally amenable to producing complexity, or generally more
sterile (much like what seems to be the case with, e.g., cellular automata (Wolfram
2002)). In the former case, all of r, s and q can be expected to be reasonably large,
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Figure 2: The effect of extraterrestrial life on q with a log-uniform prior for r, s, q in
[0, 1]3
while in the latter case they can all be expected to be near 0. This suggests that in
the prior, the parameters should be positively correlated. For our next prior, we shall
consider the extreme case where they are all lined up on the diagonal L = {(x, y, z) ∈
[10−100, 1]3 : x = y = z}, each log-uniformly distributed as above, but no longer
independent of each other. This time, the result of discovering extraterrestrial life
will be rather different: in Figure 3, we see that observing extraterrestial life has a
positive effect on our expectation of q. This can be understood since the parameters
are correlated: one instance of life on a lower level of complexity would have the
statistical effect to increase our estimates of s and q as well.
A fair criticism against this last prior is that it dogmatically confines the triple
(r, s, q) to lie on the diagonal L, thus leaving huge parts of the space [0, 1]3 with zero
probability. In the Appendix, we show that the example can be modified in such a way
that the prior is dense all over [0, 1]3 while preserving the same qualitative behavior
as regards the effect of discovering extraterrestrial life on the expected value of q.
Thus, we have quantitatively demonstrated that what we learn about q and in which
direction belief shifts after observing extraterrestrial life can depend on which prior
we use. This in turn highlights the problem of understanding to which degree the
universe is in general amenable to produce complexity on various levels. Findings for
or against correlation between levels, such as theoretical results in multiverse models
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Figure 3: The effect of extraterrestrial life on q with a log-uniform prior for r, s, q on
the diagonal L = {(x, y, z) ∈ [10−100, 1]3 : x = y = z}.
(Tegmark 2014), could have an effect on which conclusion results from the Great
Filter argument.
3 Conclusions
In summary, we still think that the intuition about the alarming effect of discovering
extraterrestrial life expressed by Hanson (1998) and Bostrom (2008) has some appeal.
In our Bayesian analysis, our first two priors (independent uniform, and independent
log-uniform) support it. The third one (perfectly correlated log-uniform), however,
contradicts it, and while we find the prior a bit too extreme to make a very good
choice, this shows that some condition on the prior is needed to obtain qualitative
conclusions about the effect on q of discovering extraterrestrial life.
A final word of caution: While a healthy dose of critical thinking regarding the
choice of Bayesian prior is always to be recommended, the case for epistemic humility
is especially strong in the study of the Fermi paradox and related “big questions”. In
more mainstream scientific studies, circumstances are often favorable, either through
the existence of a solid body of independent evidence in support of the prior, or
through the availability of sufficient amounts of data that one can reasonably hope
that the effects of the prior are (mostly) washed out in the posterior. In the present
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setting we have neither, so all conclusions from the posterior should be viewed as
highly tentative.
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Appendix
To demonstrate our claim that the expected value of q can increase in response to
discovering extraterrestrials also in cases where the prior is dense in [0, 1]3, we need
some terminology. Fix N . We write P0 for a probability measure corresponding
to picking (r, s, q) on the diagonal L as in our log-uniform diagonal example, plus
doing the appropriate Bernoulli trials for N independent planets. We write P1 for
the analogous thing, but with picking (r, s, q) according to uniform distribution on
[0, 1]3. For ε > 0, we let Pε be the convex combination εP1+(1− ε)P0, and note that
since the distribution of (r, s, q) is dense in [0, 1]3 under P1, the same is true under
Pε. Write E0, E1 and Eε for expectation under respectively P0, P1 and Pε.
Let A be any event satisfying
P0(A) > 0 . (3)
Two examples of such A is A′, defined as observing the great silence (N independent
Bernoulli (rsq) variables all taking value 0), and A′′, defined as A′ plus discovering
primitive life on a single planet. We have seen that
E0[q|A
′] < E0[q|A
′′] (4)
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and wish to show that
Eε[q|A
′] < Eε[q|A
′′] (5)
for sufficiently small ε > 0. To get from (4) to (5) it suffices to show that
lim
ε→0
Eε[q|A] = E0[q|A] (6)
for all A satisfying (3). Writing B for the event that (r, s, q) sits on the diagonal
r = s = q, and decomposing Eε[q|A] as
Eε[q|A] = Pε(B|A)Eε[q|A,B] + Pε(¬B|A)Eε[q|A,¬B]
we first note that conditioning Pε on the event B yields P0, and that conditioning Pε
on the event ¬B yields P1, so that
Eε[q|A] = Pε(B|A)E0[q|A] + Pε(¬B|A)E1[q|A] . (7)
As to the factor Pε(B|A), we get using Bayes’ Theorem that
Pε(B|A) =
Pε(B)Pε(A|B)
Pε(B)Pε(A|B) + Pε(¬B)Pε(A|¬B)
=
(1− ε)Pε(A|B)
(1 − ε)Pε(A|B) + εPε(A|¬B)
=
(1− ε)P0(A)
(1 − ε)P0(A) + εP1(A)
which tends to 1 as ε→ 0. It follows also that limε→0 Pε(¬B|A) = 0. Sending ε→ 0
in the right hand side of (7) therefore yields (6), and (5) follows as desired.
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